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educational benefits that [student body] diversity is designed to produce;" 7 (2) shows that attaining those benefits is "essential to its educational mission;" 8 and (3) makes a
showing that a diverse student body "will, in fact, yield [those] educational benefits." 9 The Court professed deference to the university institution in articulating its educational mission of fostering discourse on campus and to its "educational judgment that [student body diversity] is essential to its education mission." 10 It then gave a laundry list of the educational benefits that flowed from a diverse student body in light of that mission: "cross-racial understanding, . . . break [ing] down racial stereotypes, enabl[ing] students to better understand persons of different races, [and] classroom discussion [that] is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting." 11 The Court continued by enumerating other "benefits" of student body diversity suggested by amici that were "educational" not in the sense of "pedagogical" or pertaining to the educational setting like the prior list of benefits, but in the different but seemingly valid sense of lessons learned at school applied to society and life at large.
12
The Court's reasonable recognition that, for purposes of the compelling interest test, the university aims to effect such general societal "benefits" realized beyond the academic setting and that such benefits are in fact produced by student body diversity led it to accept another, more dubious claim for the student-body diversity rationale. It was powerfully influenced in this regard by an amicus brief filed by twenty-nine retired 7 Id., at 2339. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id., at 2339-40 (internal citations omitted). 12 "[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workplace and society, and better prepares them as professionals." Id., at 2340 (citations omitted).
military officers and civilian leaders of the U.S. armed forces. 13 The military leaders argued that "based on their decades of experience, a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security." 14 The military's claim was that the military academies and
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs at civilian colleges sought diverse student bodies because students will automatically become leaders of the armed forces upon graduation, and a diverse officer corps is essential to national security. The Court agreed that "[i]t requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective."
15
The Court thus specified two categories of related but distinct educational benefits arising from student body diversity at our nation's finest institutions of higher learning.
On the one hand, there are benefits to students, the university, and society, arising from the discourse and interactions all students will have on a racially diverse academic campus. On the other, there are benefits realized by society once minority students are graduated from the few highly selective "gate-keeping" schools that employ race-based admissions policies (only 20 percent of the nation's colleges and universities) 16 and assume professional positions of leadership in nationally sensitive non-educational 13 and the federal judiciary. 20 The thesis of this essay is that there is marked variation in the extent to which higher educational institutions seek to, and in fact, confer these two sorts of benefits. 21 Accordingly, the compelling interest test as formulated in Grutter should, by its own terms, take account of this variation in mission and causation, with the logical consequence that student body diversity might not suffice as a compelling government interest in every single higher educational context. Liberal-arts colleges represent the strongest case for the discourse benefits of student body diversity. The selective military academies represent the strongest case for the gate-keeping leadership benefits of student body diversity.
The Court casually assumed that elite civilian colleges likewise stake a persuasive claim to leadership benefits, 22 but this is a questionable assumption. It is debatable, first, because unlike military academies and professional schools, selective colleges do not claim that specialized professional training, even in an institutional leadership capacity, is one of their principal educational missions, unlike the exchange of ideas among diverse students which is at the "very core" of their educational mission. 23 Second, in today's 17 Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2340. 18 Id. 19 Id., at 2341. 20 Id. 21 Cf. id., at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Other lawsuits may focus on whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educational benefits flow from racial diversity. (That issue was not contested in Grutter ; and while th e opinion accords a 'degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.)" compelling government interest. 25 But I am not so sure that this was right, both on the terms of the Grutter "benefits" test and as a matter of educa tion policy. The robust exchange of diverse ideas on campus is certainly essential to the elite college's educational mission. But if, because of the benefits of diverse campus discourse, student body diversity is a compelling state interest for the 20 percent of the nation's colleges that use affirmative action, then surely it must be so for the 80 percent of colleges that do not. And affirmative action, to the extent it ensures that our most selective colleges, as a class, can enroll the "highly qualified" minority students that they could not have admitted but for race-based admissions programs, would necessarily set back the compelling interest in student body diversity at non-elite colleges as a group. The bottom line is that absent a claim to gate-keeping leadership benefits, the elite colleges' claim to compelling interest in student body diversity for discourse benefits alone stands on shaky ground.
In the first part of this essay, I describe the discourse benefits of student body diversity. In the second, I explain the contrasting logic of leadership benefits. The third part summarizes how different educational institutions seek to, and in fact, bring about one sort of benefit and/or the other. A brief conclusion follows.
I
What I have called "discourse" benefits are the core "educational benefits" of student body diversity, and they are, unsurprisingly, grounded in "the expansive freedoms 25 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct., at 2426-27 ("Petitioners . . . argue that diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored means. But for the reasons set forth today in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court has rejected these arguments of petitioners.") (citations omitted).
of speech and thought associated with the university environment." 26 The premise is that the university is a special First Amendment community, whose fundamental mission is the "robust exchange of ideas." 27 And the university leadership, as the moderator of this community, may exercise within a roomy but reasonable zone of discretion, "the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas. '" 28 This is just what the university has done in implementing race-based admissions policies. It has made an "educational judgment" 29 that the presence of certain minority students who would not be enrolled but for affirmative action is "essential to its 31 See id., at 2341 ("Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters."); Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 23, at *22-24; Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 23, at *25 ("Racial and ethnic diversity is educationally important because, notwithstanding decades of progress, there remain significant differences in our lives and perceptions that are undeniably linked to the realities of race."). 32 Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 23, at *24. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312, n. 48 ("People do not learn very much when they are surrounded by the likes of themselves.") (comments of the thenpresident of Princeton University on the benefits of a diverse student body). 33 Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2339-40, (citing district court opinion).
informal interactions that take place on campus. 34 And in order to ensure that minority perspectives aren't reduced to single voice-in-the-wilderness stereotypes, it is necessary to admit minority groups in sufficient numbers ("a critical mass") to impart the confidence to speak out and to stay faithful to differences within the groups.
35
The Court, while relying on the "countervailing constitutional interest" 36 of the university's free-speech rights, did not speak of particular doctrines and otherwise remained noticeably vague on the issue of deference on First Amendment grounds.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, fairly called the majority to task on the point.
37
An attempt at specification may help in understanding why the Court deferred to the university's judgment that the discourse benefits of student body diversity were compelling enough to require a race-based admissions policy.
Three different free-speech doctrines seem relevant as analogies-lines of cases concerning public fora, the government as subsidizer of speech, and the government as educator. Public-forum doctrine allows the state to impose conditions on speech occurring on certain public property so long as its regulation is not content-based. As a subsidizer of speech, the government may "encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest" 38 provided that it does not discriminate based on viewpoint. 39 As 34 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312, n. 48. 35 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2341 ("The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue. To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission. And one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students."). 36 Bakke, 438 U.S., at 313. 37 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2357 (Thomas J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 38 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991) . 39 See id.
educator, the government is allowed leeway in how it manages the educational setting, even when it exercises considerable editorial discretion over student speech.
40
No case has ever held, nor did the University of Michigan and its friends argue, that the university campus is itself a public forum, 41 and my point is not that it should be.
Rather, the public-forum rubric is important as an analogy. A basic intuition behind the doctrine 42 is that the government has an obligation to permit and protect a robust exchange of ideas in public parks, streets, and sidewalks-traditional venues accessed typically by those lacking the wherewithal to publicize their ideas by other means.
43
Restrictions on under-resourced speech in public fora, like censorship of it, would snuff out the desired communication for all time, to the detriment of a democratic society whose legitimacy lies in the responsiveness of the political process to the voices of all of its citizens. This idea of basic access to the marketplace of ideas, made imperative by the implicit risk of non-substitutability by transmission in another medium, is an enduring First Amendment theme that has appeared in contexts other than public fora. 42 Another premise of the doctrine -more clearly associated with the restriction on content-based regulation in public forums-is equal access: once the government has set up a public forum, it cannot pick and choose the content of the speech that will take place, although it may engage in regulation of the forum for reasons unrelated to speech, such as public order and safety. Just as the norm of equal access, however problematic its application to cases may be, compels content-neutrality in avowedly non-speech regulation that the government may undertake, the state's promulgation of affirmative action for the sake of all the "educational benefits" (not just the First Amendment-associated ones discussed here) of a racially diverse student body, does not on its face disadvantage any specific content in the campus exchange of ideas. 43 The analogy applies to the university affirmative-action cases in a straightforward way. Without affirmative action, there would not be enough "under-represented minorities" on elite campuses to ensure an accurate communication of minority student perspectives in the university marketplace of ideas, just as, without the provision and protection of public forums, the voices of under-resourced citizens might similarly go unheard. The "token numbers" 45 of certain minorities in the student body that would result from a race-blind admissions process might refrain from speaking without the safety and moral support of numbers, 46 or stereotyped by the majority when they do.
47
Campus exchanges, absent affirmative action, would accordingly be an imperfect marketplace of ideas, 48 unfaithful to the multi-racial democratic society that the university is seeking to serve, in the same way that freedom of speech would be a sham if under-resourced citizens with no other options were denied basic access to public fora.
Or the Court may have been thinking about the First Amendment right of the state as subsidizer of speech. The government in this capacity may promote a desired activity-such as cross-racial discourse-so long as it doesn't discriminate against certain viewpoints. 49 The University of Michigan and its friends went to great lengths to point out that their affirmative-action programs did not discriminate on the basis of the 45 Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2341. 46 See Bakke, 438 U.S., at 323 ("Their small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their principal") (Harvard College Admissions Program statement, appendix to Justice Powell's opinion). 47 See Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 23, at *28 ("Put bluntly, teaching that not all blacks think alike will be much easier when there are enough blacks around to show their diversity of thought.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted viewpoints held by the minorities who were benefited. 50 In fact, the idea of the "critical mass" envisions the selection of minority students of various viewpoints, to cancel stereotypes and to be faithful to variation of views within the minority group.
51
The idea of the government as educator is not so different from the view of it as subsidizer of speech, the main difference being the greater degree of deference owed to the state when it is actually running the educational enterprise. The basic premise is that public schools are allowed discretion in going about their educational missions, indeed, in defining those missions, even when the result is the substantial restriction or elimination of student speech. Although the case law acknowledging this deference developed in the context of high-school students whose countervailing free-speech rights might plausibly be more restricted than those of adult university students, 52 the state as educator in our case is using affirmative action to encourage speech, not to restrict it, albeit exerting editorial discretion in the form of promoting a certain kind of race-inflected speech.
The distinction between deference to the state as subsidizer of speech and the greater deference due to it as educator in its own right logically gives rise to a distinction in compelling government interest analysis between public and private universities. On the one hand, when the state or federal government is educator, it may have to look to the benefits of the public-education enterprise as a whole, whether state-or nationwide, 50 See, e.g., Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 23, at *30 (The Law School's need for a critical mass of minority students is not based on a "belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue."). 51 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2341. Of course, viewpoint neutrality in fact would be contingent on existing diversity of viewpoints in the minority group-if, for example, 95% of the minority group hold a "progressive" viewpoint, then, theoretical neutrality between progressive and conservative views would be a near-dead letter. 52 See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 40.
rather than to what is best for a particular public school in the system. 53 By contrast, the private institution of higher learning necessarily formulates its compelling interests more narrowly in terms of what is good for itself alone. Accordingly, to the extent that affirmative action at elite public universities promotes diversity on those campuses at the cost of racial diversity at other less prestigious schools in the state, the compelling government interest test should take account of the trade-off. Moreover, when the government funds a private institution of higher education rather than running it, one would think the institution ought to receive greater deference to its First Amendment rights as educator because of its private status.
To be accurate, when a public university uses affirmative action to promote the exchange of ideas on campus, it does engage in a form of content-based, viewpoint discrimination, in tension with the doctrines of public fora and the state as subsidizer of speech. That is to say, the university is making a judgment that ideas shaped by minority racial experiences have an especially high value in the campus exchange of ideas, say, as compared to ideas influenced by religious, socioeconomic, or ideological differences, and should accordingly be subsidized in the form of race-conscious admission policies. This is where the Court's insistence on deference to the "Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission" 54 appears to lean very heavily on the discretion of the state as educator-with respect to a university's threshold determination that racial diversity should be privileged over other sorts of diversity in 53 Cf. Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2354-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that Michigan does not have a compelling state interest in maintaining an elite law school); id., at 2348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I find particularly unanswerable [Justice Thomas's] central point: that the allegedly 'compelling state interest' at issue here is not the incremental 'educational benefit' that emanates from fabled 'critical mass' of minority students, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities."). 54 Grutter, 123 S. Ct., at 2329. campus discourse. 55 It follows naturally that a school, for instance a historically black college, might within its discretion choose not to privilege racial diversity at all, if based on a good-faith judgment that a diverse student body was not essential to its educational mission, even though other schools think it a compelling interest.
56
II I have sought so far to describe a universal, discourse-focused argument that universities as a class make about why the state's interest in a diverse student body is compelling. The "robust exchange of ideas" is the core of the university's mission.
Student body diversity promotes campus exchange of ideas informed by race, and, as a result, imparts an appreciation of racial diversity that will reverberate through life. These "educational benefits" are documented by evidentiary studies. 57 Such benefits are central to a university's conceptualization of its educational mission, the pedagogical strategies it chooses to accomplish that mission, and, ultimately, its underlying First Amendment rights. Consequently, the university is entitled to deference in its decision to privilege 55 Professor Abner Greene has made the same conclusion in the broader context of government speech and subsidies of speech in non-educational contexts. "Government both may and should promote contested conceptions of the good, through direct speech acts and through funding private speech with conditions attached." Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 68-69 (2000). While I can afford to remain agnostic on the generalized point (i.e., assuming away the crutch of educational institutional deference) for the purposes of this essay, I find his argument compelling both as a lens for understanding the doctrine, and as a normative, neo-Platonic conceptualization of the state's purpose. 56 See 123 S. Ct., at 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The majority grants deference to the Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits. It follows, therefore, that an [historically black college's] assessment that racial homogeneity will yield educational benefits would similarly be given deference.") (internal citations omitted). See also Rudenstine, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 23, at 38 ("institutions may choose on their own to take less account of race, ethnicity, and gender in admissions."). Another place where deference to the university (as educator) does special work concerns the actual numerical determination of the "critical mass of underrepresented minorities" necessary to achieve the compelling government interest in diversity, but that is more a question of narrow tailoring. Compare Grutter , 123 S. Ct., at 2342 -44 (majority opinion), with id., at 2365-69 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 57 See id., at 2340. race-inflected discourse over other sorts of idea exchange by deploying a race-based admissions policy.
One plausible post-educational, second-order benefit of student body diversity, which Justice Powell mentioned in his Bakke opinion, was the exposure of future leaders to diverse discourse on campus. Quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 58 he opined that "[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection." 59 His implicit assumption was that a university education was necessary to attain a position of national leadership.
Consequently, any discourse benefits delivered by a university education would be reflected in the attitudes and qualifications of the leadership class, regardless of the racial make-up of that class. That is to say, the discourse benefit to national leadership can, in theory and logic, be realized without leadership diversity.
60
But in Grutteŗ the Court endorsed a subtly, but importantly, different claim:
diverse discourse on campus and its societal reverberations notwithstanding, student body diversity at a particular educational institution is sought to produce, and in fact produces, not just racial-majority leaders who are open to diverse perspectives, but actual and substantial racial diversity in the leadership ranks of important non-educational institutions. As Justice Breyer put it during oral argument to counsel for petitioner Barbara Grutter: "among other things that they tell us on the other side is that many 58 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 59 Bakke, 438 U.S., at 312-13. 60 The point might be made clearer by thinking of ideological diversity. Indubitably an exposure to Karl Marx's philosophy of history at the university, including by interaction with Marxist scholars and student organizations like the Spartacus League will benefit a student's understanding of various social, economic, and political issues. It is quite a different thing to say that ideological diversity requires that we have some Marxists in leadership positions that require university education as a qualification.
people feel in the schools, the Universities, that the way-the only way to break this The Naval Academy seeks to give "young men and women the up-to-date academic and professional training needed to be effective naval and marine officers in their assignments after graduation." 76 It seeks a few good men and women with a certain mentality and ambition: "If you have a strong will to achieve, desire a real challenge, and want to be a leader serving your country, the opportunity of a lifetime could begin for you at the United States Naval Academy." 77 The most versatile, the most durable, in an ultimate sense the most practical knowledge and intellectual resources which [can] now be offered are those impractical arts and sciences around which the liberal arts education has long centered: the capacity to see and feel, to grasp, respond and act over a widening arc of experience; the disposition and ability to think, to question, to use knowledge to order an ever-extending range of reality; the elasticity to grow, to perceive more widely and more deeply, and perhaps to create; the understanding to decide where to stand and the will and tenacity to do so; the wit and wisdom, the humanity and the humor to try to see oneself, one's society, and one's world with open eyes, to live a life usefully, to help things in which one believes on their way. This is not the whole of a liberal arts education, but as I understand it, this range of goals is close to its core. 79 And a former president of Williams's archrival Amherst once remarked:
A university or a liberal arts college, quite apart from any religious affiliations, is pledged to a special faith of its own. It believes first that men and women can live together in a community where they teach and learn from each other . . . . A good college seeks not merely a coterie of the like-minded, to reinforce convictions already formed, but seeks out every vein of talent and opinion from every possible background, so that from the ferment of ideas freely exchanged it can advance to new conclusions. 80 Brown University's website provides:
The goal of the Brown Curriculum is for students to work toward a liberal education, in which students learn the knowledge and ways of thinking in a range of academic disciplines, in which they practice habits of self-reflection and empathy for others, and in which they are challenged to articulate and examine the moral convictions that will guide them through life. 81 Nor, for that matter, can civilian undergraduate colleges, or indeed, any civilian institution of higher learning, assert the sort of robust causal claim that the military academies can, that diverse student bodies will necessarily cause leadership diversity in 79 82 They are not a necessary condition because officers may also be commissioned through ten-to-fourteen week post-undergraduate officer candidate schools and enlisted commissioning programs. In my experience, however, minority officers who are commissioned out of the military service academies command a special respect from the enlisted ranks because academy graduates have traditionally formed the backbone of the professional officer corps. It is, in this sense, a particularly poignant statement about the fairness, openness, and legitimacy of leadership access for enlisted to see minority officers commissioned out of the highly selective service academies. 83 As a mark of their importance to the nation, all commissioned officers have their commissions signed by the President of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §3 (The President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."). 84 The service academies permit cadets and midshipmen to resign after the second year without incurring an active-duty service obligation. Officer candidates in ROTC programs can resign after their first year without incurring a service obligation. Those who drop out after that point must serve an enlisted tour or go to jail, unless it is determined that there was a compelling reason in which case authorities may permit repayment of scholarship monies with interest. All who graduate are commissioned as officers and serve some active duty, absent a medical or other exception rarely granted. 85 92 We might add that 10 more 88 Id., at 2340. 89 The FBI Academy and state police academies are similar to the military academies in terms of sufficiency for entrance into an institution benefited by racial diversity in composition, but they are not undergraduate, graduate, or professional schools in the common sense. Nor are they the sort of nationally prominent institutions the Court seems to have had in mind when talking about leadership diversity. The analysis of affirmative action in those contexts, then, should turn on a direct analysis of diversity as a compelling interest in the non-educational institution-the FBI or the state police as appropriate-without couching it in terms of the gate-keeping "educational" institution. An excellent undergraduate education is an enormous advantage in life.
But we know that a college degree, by itself, is increasingly seen as inadequate preparation for many careers for which it once sufficed. Graduate training has long been necessary for aspiring doctors, lawyers, educators, scholars, research scientists, and clergy; in today's world, advanced degrees are also seen as highly desirable, if not essential, for many other callings, including leadership positions in business, public affairs, and the not-for-profit sector.
102
Nor is specialized job training, even in a leadership capacity-to be a military officer, a corporate executive, a judge, a politician, or even a non-profit administrator-a principal mission of the typical elite undergraduate institution, which, in the liberal-arts tradition, is more concerned with teaching students how to think critically in a generalist way, with one's "major" more a matter of emphasis than specialization.
103
As a final attempt to understand the difference between leadership and discourse benefits, it may be helpful to engage in a counter-factual thought experiment. If the military academies were to allow cadets and midshipmen to participate in every aspect of academy life yet opt for civilian jobs upon graduation, and most of the minority students underrepresented in the officer corps were to choose civilian life, then student body diversity would produce robust discourse benefits without leadership benefits.
Conversely, if selective civilian schools allowed underrepresented minorities to enroll exclusively in courses with overwhelming minority populations, to reside in racially concentrated housing, to participate exclusively in minority-centric extracurricular activities, and informally to avoid even casual interaction with non-minorities on campus,
and a large proportion of underrepresented minorities in fact chose to segregate themselves in these ways, then there would be no discourse benefits to student body diversity, 104 but the satisfaction of an interest gauged by racial diversity in the numbers of graduates assuming leadership positions in nationally prominent non-educational institutions would be unaffected.
III
Let's return to the doctrinal clarification of the diversity test I offered at the beginning of this essay. A compelling state interest in student body diversity exists when the higher educational unit (1) has identified the "educational benefits" diversity is "designed to produce" and shows (2) that attaining those benefits is "essential to its educational mission," and (3) that student body diversity does in fact produce those mission-essential benefits. With respect to discourse benefits, the test seems easily satisfied: "the robust exchange of ideas" is at the core of a university's (in the ideal, universal sense) educational mission and such discourse produces documented educational benefits on campus and beyond.
It should be evident that certain kinds of educational units can make a better claim to discourse benefits than others because their educational mission is more closely associated with the exchange of ideas in which differing racial perspectives would be relevant. For example, the curricula at liberal-arts colleges, law schools, public-policy schools, business-management schools, or graduate departments in sociology and comparative literature, deal with issues and subject matter to which different racial experiences are deeply relevant. By contrast, undergraduate engineering schools, military academies, graduate programs in theoretical physics or mathematics, and medical schools are not so focused on subjects usefully illuminated by racial inflections.
As Justice Powell put it in Bakke: "It may be argued that there is greater force to these views [in the value of student body diversity] at the undergraduate level than in a medical school where the training is professional competency."
105
Of course, that is not to say that a school in the latter category can make no claim whatsoever to seeking and conferring the discourse benefits of a diverse student body.
No educational institution, not even a military academy, which is simultaneously an educational and a military installation, 106 says that its mission does not value the discourse benefits of student body diversity at all. And, as Justice Powell observed with respect to medical schools:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background -whether it be 105 438 U.S., at 313. ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity. 107 Likewise, the experiences and views of minority cadets and midshipmen, while not so important in close-order drill, naval propulsion systems class, or celestial navigation, are certainly valuable in academy and ROTC classes on leadership, ethics, politics, and history. Furthermore, there is always interaction on campus outside of the classroom, at the dormitory, or through sports or other extracurricular activities. All of this, however, is consistent with my point: depending on the nature of a specific educational institution, there is variation in the degree to which student body diversity is sought to produce and in fact produces discourse benefits.
Determining the leadership diversity benefits of a diverse student body at different sorts of institutions is more complicated in certain respects and easier in others. A closer call under a strict test would be the sort of claim that business schools might make. A principal mission of the business school is to train corporate managers. If we are to have a racially diverse corporate leadership, we must have racially diverse student bodies at selective business schools. It is nationally important to have racially diverse corporate leadership because many corporate workers are minorities and because the global business environment is a multi-racial one. A closer case yet might be medical schools. Medical doctors must graduate from medical school. Diverse student bodies are therefore necessary for a racially diverse medical profession, but is a diverse medical profession a compelling national need? Perhaps so, because medical treatment is as much about social understanding and wisdom as it is about science.
To be fair, one could imagine a more general form of "strict" test for the 20 percent of the nation's top colleges that use affirmative action. That is to say, a principal mission of selective colleges like the members of the Ivy League, is to train leaders of society at large in a general way. If we are to have racial diversity in the leadership of the nation, we must have racial diversity at the Ivy League.
The crucial difference between this articulation and the others is the inability of the civilian college educational unit to make a more precise claim of leadership mission and effect, that a diverse student body will lead to diversity in the leadership of a specific institution or profession in which there is a compelling need for racial diversity. The claim has an undeniable commonsense appeal, and it may be causally accurate, albeit in a weak sense.
108 But this sort of generalized, open-ended claim to prospective social benefit, like its retrospective remedy counterpart-the interest in remedying "societal" vice institutional discrimination that was held to be unconstitutional in Wygant v Jackson
Bd. Of Education, 109 is simply too protean to merit incorporation in a substantive legal test, particularly one that is meant to be as exacting as the compelling interest standard.
If an argument for student body diversity is decisive on the basis of an assertion of prospective general societal benefit, it is hard to see the conditions under which that argument might fail.
To sum up, then, different institutions of higher learning seek and confer the educational benefits of student body diversity to varying degrees. Military academies seek diverse students for a diverse officer corps and in fact produce it, but they are not so much interested in the discourse benefits of student body diversity though it is part of their mission. Law schools strongly seek and produce both the discourse and institutional leadership benefits of a diverse student body; business schools as well, although possibly less so on both dimensions. Medical schools make the weakest argument of the professional schools to both institutional leadership and discourse benefits, but they can field an argument on both fronts nonetheless. Colleges can make the strongest claim to discourse benefits, but no real claim to institutional or professional leadership benefits.
Should those discourse benefits be enough to find a compelling government interest in student body diversity at the few selective public and private colleges that use 108 111 See Bakke, 112 I call "diversity" an associative virtue because it is a good achieved only in the context of mutual interaction, like "friendship" by contrast to virtues like "self-mastery" which are personally realized though in a social or political context. That is not to say that diversity as an associative value does not have its analogue in strictly personal virtues, such as the idea of human dividedness at the root of Isaiah Berlin's thought. 113 The first chief justice of the Supreme Court was one of many founders who believed that homogeneity, and not diversity, was the desired norm. "Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs . . . . This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous and alien sovereignties." THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 9 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Early twentieth-century American immigration statutes, which established quotas on immigration by national origin that discriminated most against Asian immigrants, reflected to some extent the resilience of the countervailing norm of racial homogeneity. The national-origin system continued to be a prominent feature of the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act, and was only abolished in 1965. Similarly, state-sponsored segregation enforced a de facto hierarchical accommodation of racial diversity that is inconsistent with the fundamental human equality across races that is a premise of the present multi-racial diversity norm. Indeed, the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions that are the cultural heritage of Western civilization rejected diversity, in the closely related sense of multicultural equality, as an invitation to chaos, choosing to embrace instead cultural unity and hierarchy centered upon the prevailing civilization.
condition and qualified rejection of its antinomy, racial homogeneity, as a normatively compelling form of social ordering. 114 The sense of diversity as a virtue has special importance for a multi-racial nation.
All nations, whether racially heterogeneous or homogeneous, must deal with the external descriptive condition of racial diversity in the world community at large, but a multiracial nation must confront it as an issue of internal governance. 115 The issue takes on particular salience when racial differences correlate to inequalities of socioeconomic wealth and political power, and it is even more urgent when the dynamics of population growth are such that have-not races are reproducing at greater rates than the haves.
Uncorrected, race-correlated material inequities might lead to social instability and national decline. Skillfully managed, the condition of stable internal racial diversity should also give the multi-racial nation a comparative advantage over non-diverse nations in its external relations with a diverse yet increasingly intertwined world.
Our institutions of higher learning, as a class, occupy a special place in the potential for realization of racial diversity (in its normative sense) for two related reasons.
They are a principal means by which citizens are taught social values such as the virtue of racial diversity. These are the discourse benefits I have talked about, and they have to do with how all citizens, regardless of race, view society and life. Our universities are also an important training ground for the leaders of a racially diverse society in which higher education is a virtual necessity for significant socioeconomic and political advancement.
This gate-keeping function means that for the nation to have the benefit of leadership 114 "Qualified," because racial or ethnic group self-determination may be the only option in the context of states with intractable histories of inter-ethnic tension. 115 diversity, it must have minorities at its universities. It follows as a logical matter that racial diversity among student populations at our colleges and universities is potentially a compelling government interest, to ensure representation both of minority viewpoints and experiences on campus and of racial minorities in our leadership elites upon graduation.
The very best schools say that they must have race-based admissions policies to enroll the highly qualified minority applicants necessary to achieve the compelling interest in racially diverse student bodies.
But these same elite educational institutions have marked differences in mission and emphasis, owing to the many needs of the society they serve and the corresponding scale of the higher educational enterprise as a whole. The highly selective military academies, for example, seek student body diversity more for the sake of leadership diversity in the nation's armed forces than for the benefit of a robust exchange on campus of ideas formed by racially diverse experiences, which is the principal aim of the selective undergraduate schools that are their civilian counterpart. And while selective civilian undergraduate institutions may convincingly claim that they seek student body diversity to produce the campus and societal benefits of diverse discourse on the academic campus, and that courts should defer to their educational judgment that these benefit are compelling, they are not so clearly entitled to claim that they consciously seek to train institutional and professional leaders-officers, judges, politicians, corporate executives-and that undergraduate student body diversity causes the benefit of institutional and professional leadership diversity in anything other than a very general, hence legally suspect, way. Not only is such specialized training in tension with the fundamental mission of the liberal-arts college institution, the individuals or electorates who govern access to leadership in nationally sensitive institutions like the federal judiciary, the Senate, and corporate boardrooms, (the nation's officer corps being the unique and important exception), may promote racial diversity on their own without regard to whether a person went to an elite college, and, more important for our purposes, it is increasingly the case that those who seek leadership positions in institutions of national importance must obtain further, specialized training at graduate and professional schools who have, as a class, the narrow educational mission of leadership and professional diversity.
But even in terms of the admittedly important benefit of diverse discourse, the case for a compelling government interest in student body diversity at elite colleges is problematic, notwithstanding the Court's summary acquiescence on the point in Gratz.
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The self-interested argument of the few selective public and private undergraduate schools that employ affirmative action is that without it, they must reject highly qualified minority applicants at the cost of meaningful student body diversity on their campuses.
This means that with affirmative action at the elite colleges, that proportion of less selective colleges (80 percent of all colleges) with very few minority students have no chance to enroll these same highly qualified minority candidates, at the expense of their own presumptively compelling interests in student body diversity. And even those less selective undergraduate programs with diverse student populations will suffer a qualitative loss in their campus discourse because of the flight of highly qualified minority students to elite colleges engineered by affirmative action. It might not be fair to put a private college with government funding to answer for the costs of this tradeoff between the elite and non-elite colleges in compelling government interest analysis, but surely, a state with a portfolio of public institutions of higher learning ought not be afforded the same latitude. 117 And if the benefit of diverse discourse at elite public colleges alone does not suffice as a compelling state interest, it seems necessary to reach the same legal conclusion for their private counterparts, to preempt the latter from cherry picking all highly qualified minority college students.
Is it better, then, to allow affirmative action at our most prestigious colleges so that they may each achieve robust student body diversity, or to dilute the concentration of highly qualified minority candidates at elite colleges, sharing them with less prestigious schools and doing away with affirmative action altogether at the undergraduate level?
This seems to me a very hard question. On the one hand, to the extent that the causal claim of elite colleges to leadership diversity is right, 118 the latter choice would diminish the direct representation of racial minorities in the leadership of nationally sensitive institutions and, also, would lessen the exposure to undergraduate-campus diversity of white and other students not benefited by affirmative action who later become such leaders.
On the other hand, to the extent that graduate and professional schools have displaced selective colleges as the crucial gate-keeping educational units for leadership diversity (again, with the exception of the military academies and ROTC for the military officer corps), getting rid of undergraduate affirmative action while keeping it at the graduate level would have little effect on leadership diversity but considerable salutary 117 I would think that how this plays out in practice is complicated, because a State might reasonably choose to invest in a nationally prominent "flagship" university, including its undergraduate arms, as opposed to its other state institutions of higher learning. That logic is somewhat undermined to the extent a national reputation is made by the research and scholarship conducted by the faculty and students of a public university's graduate and professional schools, which could continue to employ affirmative action. Indeed, those graduate and professional programs might be benefited by greater parity in state colleges and undergraduate programs, which could serve as in-state feeder institutions to those programs. 118118 See supra note 98.
The Court's lack of clarity about the diversity rationale illuminates just how difficult it is to operationalize an important social value like "diversity" into a workable legal rule that can in turn be applied to a vast, shifting social institutional landscape while remaining faithful to the underlying value. The difficulty is compounded by the powerful, seemingly countervailing norm of formal racial equality, guarded by its own formidable doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause. 122 It is no wonder, then, that the Court, inspired by the virtues of diversity and the specific value of student body diversity lauded by forces as disparate as university dons and warrior chieftains, articulated a doctrine that doesn't quite fit the rich fabric of fact. This essay has been an attempt at fresh analysis, but, at bottom, its theme is wholly unoriginal: "Context matters when reviewing racebased governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause." 
